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A nd in the development of our liberty insistence upon procedural
regularity has been a large factor.1
It is the purpose of this Article to survey significant procedural
developments in federal administrative practice and procedure. The
topics to be considered within this broad area are (1) investigational
procedures, (2) the steps of the adjudicative process-the hearing
before the presiding officer, his decision, its review and the agency de-
cision-and (3) substantive rule-making procedure. In the process
we should be able to observe the extent to which these developments
have tended to promote maximum freedom of person and property
compatible with Congressionally directed governmental regulation.
First, however, brief mention should be made of three general legis-
lative efforts in the area of federal administrative procedure, one per-
fected and two in evolution. The Administrative Conference of the
United States, patterned somewhat after the Judicial Conference of
the United States as an instrument to recommend administrative pro-
cedural reform, was created by statute on August 30, 1964.' The
Senate Judiciary Committee, through its Subcommittee on Admin-
istrative Practice and Procedure, is pressing strongly for the right of
every attorney in good standing before the Bar of his state to qualify
without further examination as a practitioner before federal agencies.'
* Portions of this Article appeared in substantially the same form in 1964 Proceedings,
Association of American Law Schools, pt. 1 at 30-36. The consent of the Association to
the reproduction of such portions is gratefully acknowledged.
** B.A., LL.B., University of Washington; LL.M., Harvard University; S.J.D., George-
town University; Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University; Member, Board of Con-
sultants, Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee; Member of Council, Administrative Law Section, American Bar Association; Chair-
man, Ordinance and Administrative Regulations Committee, Local Government Law Sec-
tion American Bar Association; General Counsel, Federal Communications Commission,
1958-61.
1Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 477 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), quoted in
Att'y Gen. Comm. on Administrative Procedure, Administrative Procedure in Government
Agencies, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 216 (1941).
'Administrative Conference Act, 78 State. 615 (1964), 5 U.S.C. 5 1045 (Supp. 1964).
3To this end, S. 1466, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. (1963), was approved by the Senate De-
cember 6, 1963, but was not acted upon by the House of Representatives; it is being re-
introduced in the 89th Congress, however. For years this right has been recognized in prac-
tice or under the rules of a number of federal agencies.
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On a broader scale the Committee is addressing itself with concern to
a sweeping revision of the Administrative Procedure Act,4 reflective
of the public interest in efficiency of governmental affairs and the
individual interest in procedural due process and in Government
policymaking.s
II. INVESTIGATION
A. Witnesses' Right To Counsel
Generally, agency rules deal in limited fashion with the right to
counsel in investigatory proceedings.! Recently, however, the Federal
Trade Commission amended its rules7 to adopt the principles laid
down in Mead Corp.' regarding a witness' right to representation by
counsel in investigatory proceedings. The new Securities Exchange
Commission rules seem at least equally liberal.!
Mead apparently is patterned largely from two recent decisions
of the federal district courts."0 In the case, the FTC extended the
4 60 Stat. 237 (1946), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 1001 (1958).
5 S. 1663, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). After hearings were held before the Subcommit-
tee on July 21-23, 1964, Hearings on S. 1663 Before the Subcommittee on Administrative
Practice and Procedure of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1964). S. 1663 was revised and reintroduced in the Senate as S. 1336, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965), on March 4, 1965, by Senators Everett Dirksen and Edward V. Long. For a dis-
cussion of the bill as introduced in the 88th Congress, see Cramton, Administrative Procedure
Reform: The Effects of S. 1663 on the Conduct of Federal Rate Proceedings, 16 Ad. L.
Rev. 108 (1964).
A comprehensive appraisal of the continuing need for administrative procedural re-
forms is contained in Fisk, Legislation and Administrative Law, 17 Ad. L. Rev. 115
(1965), weighing the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, the proposed "Code
of Federal Administrative Procedure" popularly referred to as the ABA Code (embodied
in S. 2335 in the 88th Congress), and S. 1663 (88th Congress) as revised by committee
print dated April 20, 1964 of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on
Administrative Practice and Procedure .
6 See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 1.1 (1965) (FCC governed by ad hoc judgment of Commission);
cf. 14 C.F.R. S 305.9 (1965) (CAB) (right to counsel expressly given to witnesses in in-
formal nonpublic investigations); See also 29 Fed. Reg. 6460, 6473 (1964), proposing a
Federal Maritime Commission rule (46 C.F.R. § 502.290) limiting the right of a compulsory
witness in an investigation to be accompanied by counsel.
716 C.F.R. § 1.36 (Supp. 1965).
813 Ad. L. Dec. 2d 117 (FTC 1963).
SIn an SEC investigatory proceeding in which a witness is sworn under Commission
order, such proceeding being termed a "formal investigative proceeding," 17 C.F.R. § 203.4,
(Supp. 1965), the witness is entitled to counsel who, in turn, may advise the witness and
question him "briefly at the conclusion of the examination to clarify any of the answers
such person has given .. " 17 C.F.R. § 203.7(c) (1)-(2) (Supp. 1965). Moreover, unless
otherwise ordered by the Commission, if the record contains implications of wrongdoing by
the witness, he shall have a reasonable opportunity for cross examination and production of
rebuttal testimony or documentary evidence. The determination of reasonableness is vested
in the officer conducting the investigation, and contemplates a balancing of a full oppor-
tunity to the person to be heard with considerations of administrative efficiency and avoidance
of undue delay. 17 C.F.R. § 203.7(d) (Supp. 1965).
" Wanderer v. Kaplan, 12 Ad. L. Dec. 2d 837 (D.D.C. 1962); FCC v. Schreiber, 201 F.
Supp. 421 (S.D. Cal. 1962), modified, 329 F.2d 517 (9th Cir.), modified, 85 S. Ct. 1459
(1965). See also Hall v. Lermke, 12 Ad. L. Dec. 2d 840 (N.D. Il. 1962) (temporary re-
straining order granted).
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customary rights of a subpoenaed witness to be accompanied by coun-
sel and to be personally advised by counsel by according to counsel
the broader representation rights to object to questions asked of the
witness he represents and to state his reasons on the record. Hannah
v. Larche" was distinguished as involving a more general investiga-
tion, indicating the FTC may restrict its liberalized policy to an
investigation leading to possible adjudicative proceedings involving
the witness. This indication is not expressed in its revised rule 1.3 6;
12
however, that rule is one of a series related to investigation of possible
violations of law and of FTC cease-and-desist orders. 3
An investigation of a broad nature did not deter a United States
district court in FCC v. Schreiber" from coming to essentially the
same conclusion as the FTC had reached in Mead. The trial court's
order, however, was modified on appeal, 5 with the effect that counsel
representing a "program packager" under a subpoena duces tecum
in a general FCC inquiry into sources and practices involved in tele-
vision programming was precluded from raising objections on the
record before the presiding officer. A divided Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit concluded that the term "represented" in section
6(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act failed to confer such a
right in a non-adjudicative proceeding. The dissenting judge dis-
agreed,"0 supporting his seemingly more logical construction by refer-
ence to the legislative history of this subsection, the Attorney Gen-
eral's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act' and Bulletin
No. 7" of the Administrative Conference of the United States.
The FCC petitioned for certiorari, raising an issue dealt with under
the final heading of this Article. Several months after the Court
of Appeals' decision, the FCC amended its procedural rules to permit
counsel for a subpoenaed witness in an investigative proceeding to
make objections on the record and to state briefly his reasons there-
for." The Supreme Court, granting certiorari on the issue to be dis-
cussed below, in its decision dealt only in passing with the question
of the scope of representation to which a witness is entitled: "Find-
ing this amendment to be 'in accord with respondent's legal posi-
" 363 U.S. 420 (1960).
"216 C.F.R. § 1.36 (Supp. 1965) (FTC).
3 See 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.31-1.39 (Supp. 1965) (FTC).
14 201 F. Supp. 421 (S.D. Cal. 1962).
15 329 F.2d 517 (9th Cir.), modified and remanded to district court with directive to
enforce subpoena without qualification, 85 S. Ct. 1459 (1965).
' 329 F.2d at 535-38.
" Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 61-62 (1947).
s Administrative Conference of the United States, Report of the Fourth Plenary Session
1924 Fed. Reg. 12774-75 (1964).
4 (June 29, 1962).
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tion on this matter,' respondents did not seek review of the ruling
below. Given the change in the Commission's rules, we need not,
and do not, express any views as to the legality of the prior rules
concerning a witness' right to the assistance of counsel."'
The prior rules (in effect an order of the Commission concerning
the manner in which an inquiry proceeding should be conducted),
as enforced by the presiding examiner, prohibited a witness' counsel
from taking exception to, requesting clarification of, or objecting to
any question during the course of interrogation of his client. Counsel
could not consult with his client upon his own initiative, but could
only do so upon the request of the client and upon approval by the
examiner."1
B. Subpoenas
Generally, certain agencies freely issue subpoenas, although fre-
quently subject to motion to quash; others require a showing of
relevancy or materiality before granting a subpoena request." Two
recent agency decisions concerning the availability and use of sub-
poenas are particularly noteworthy."
In one case the SEC properly denied a subpoena directed to its
membership." The risk of attaining involuntary judge-witness status
under such conditions is obvious and should be avoided in the absence
of compelling reasons, such as supported allegations of misconduct.
Moreover, freedom of administrative deliberation is imperiled by sub-
sequent judicial investigation into the "mental processes" of the
administrator. 5
"
5 FCC v. Schreiber, 85 S. Ct. 1459, 1466 n. 15 (1965).
21 Ibid.
21Compare 47 C.F.R. § 1.333(b)-(c) (1965) (FCC) and 14 C.F.R. § 302.19(c)-(e)
(1965) (CAB), with 29 C.F.R. § 102.31(a)-(b) (1965) (NLRB).
"Also it should be noted in passing that investigative demands of the Department of
Justice, under the recently enacted Anti-Trust Civil Process Act, 76 Star. 548 (1962), 15
U.S.C. § 1311 (Supp. IV, 1963), broadening the Department's former limited subpoena
powers, were recently held to be valid against attack on grounds of unreasonable search and
seizure and self-incrimination. Hyster Co. v. United States, 338 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1964).
"4 San Francisco Mining Exch., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7247 (Dec. 2,
1964), 15 Ad. L. Dec. 2d 91.
" In Union Say. Bank v. Saxon, 209 F. Supp. 319 (D.D.C. 1962), it was stated that
taking the oral deposition of an agency head is not ordinarily allowed; but if the allegation
is made that his action in granting a branch-bank certificate was affected by his personal
relationship with the president of the bank, an exception is permitted which, however, is
restricted to the procedural action taken by the defendant as to the subject matter of the
case and not as to the workings of his mind. See also Harvey Aluminum (Inc.) v. NLRB,
335 F.2d 749, 755 (9th Cir. 1964) (direct demands upon the Secretary of Labor and the
Attorney General for agency documents do not call into play the "housekeeping regula-
tions" of the departments imposing agency approval requirements upon subordinate em-
ployees responding to subpoena); Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v. NLRB, 329 F.2d 200, 208
(4th Cir. 1964) ("mental process" rule inapplicable where prima facie case of misconduct
is shown).
[Vol. 19:239
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In the other proceeding, the FCC Review Board2' recently granted
an appeal from an examiner's ruling and quashed a subpoena duces
tecum issued in behalf of the FCC Broadcast Bureau in a revocation
proceeding, 7 on the ground that the subpoena lacked the specificity
required by the applicable agency rule.2" The Board cited with ap-
proval a 1955 FCC 9 decision which had adopted the reasoning of Mr.
Justice Holmes ° denouncing issuance of subpoenas for fishing ex-
peditions. Significantly, this Review Board decision applies the same
tests to the Commission's prosecuting arm as are applied to private
parties. The decision also expresses a more conservative attitude
toward Government fishing expeditions, with due allowance for
statutory differences affecting agency powers and functions, than
may be permissible under Supreme Court opinions2 ' subsequent to the
Holmes opinion referred to above. It is true, of course, that an agency
may voluntarily restrict its exercise of power by procedural rule, and
the extreme breadth of the subpoena requested by the Broadcast
Bureau seemed heedless of the specificity provision.2 In a similar vein,
the SEC has moved effectively to furnish examiners with express
guides to avoid the issuance of oppressive subpoenas.'
C. Discovery
Although there is progress toward opening the gates leading to
general discovery, it presently is far from being an accepted practice.
However, a soft step was taken in this direction with the adoption
of Recommendation No. 30 by the Administrative Conference of the
United States' on December 15, 1962. In so acting, the Conference re-
sponded mildly to a forceful and well-documented recommendation-
based partly on the not unfavorable experience of those agencies which
permitted discovery-of its Committee on Compliance and Enforce-
ment Proceedings. The Conference Report recommended approval of
the principle of discovery in agency adjudicatory hearings and the
adoption of agency rules permitting discovery to the extent and in a
manner appropriate to the proceedings of the particular agency. The
Committee, however, had recommended that each agency should pro-
" Discussed in text accompanying notes 152-66 infra.
2 Radio Station WTIF, Inc., 16 Ad. L. Dec. 2d 626 (FCC 1964).
2'47 C.F.R. § 1.333(b) (1965) (FCC).
" Spartan Radiocasting Co., 5 Ad. L. Dec. 2d 213 (FCC 1955).
30 FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 306-07 (1924).
31 See, e.g., United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950); Oklahoma Press
Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946). See also Stason & Cooper, Cases and Other
Materials on Administrative Tribunals 255-60 (3d ed. 1957).
32 4 7 C.F.R. S 1.333(b) (1965) (FCC).
3317 C.F.R. § 201.14(b) (1964) (SEC).
' For a general discussion of the accomplishments of the Conference, see Fuchs, The
Administrative Conference of the United States, 15 Ad. L. Rev. 6 (1963).
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vide for discovery unless restricted by statute from doing so. The
Committee was not deterred by the argument that agencies are non-
adversary guardians of the public interest; although it considered this
and other arguments, the position was taken that fairness to all con-
cerned should be the primary concern of government. In reaching its
conclusion in favor of discovery, the Committee further pointed to
such factors as (1) the success of pretrial discovery under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in expediting proceedings; (2) the pre-
dictable decreases in hearing recesses in administrative proceedings
and the resulting elimination of the surprise condition with the adop-
tion of discovery rules; (3) the inconsistency between modern ac-
ceptance of pre-hearing conferences as an aid to the administrative
process and resistance toward its only enforcing arm-the liberal
exercise of discovery; (4) the apparently undisturbing experience of
the very few administrative agencies which provide for discovery.""
Certain developments in some of the agencies reflect a tendency to
allow discovery but excluding information obtained in agency investi-
gations and internal memoranda from the operative rules. The FTC,
although progressive in regard to discovery,"" recently exempted from
its own discovery rules by ad hoc decision a staff memorandum pre-
pared during unsuccessful consent (nonadjudicative) negotiations
preceding the issuance of the complaint."' The FTC also has estab-
lished disclosure procedures applicable to special reports forming the
basis of an exhibit given counsel, and has stated principles governing
the right of inspection of Government files." The Civil Aeronautics
Board recently amended its pre-hearing rules to allow documentary
discovery but excluding government files." The National Labor Rela-
tions Board"9 seems to follow the same policy as the CAB, and the
SEC is equally traditional concerning matter gathered in investiga-
tions, deeming it confidential.4 ' In sharp contrast is the FCC which
still flatly denies discovery,4 ' although it currently is re-examining
this policy.
The pros and cons of transplanting to administrative proceedings
the federal rules of procedure in regard to discovery have been ably
5 1963 Report of the Committee on Agency Rule-Making, 16 Ad. L. Rev. 302, 319-21
(1964).
'
0 See 16 C.F.R. § 1.134 (Supp. 1965) (FTC).
'
7 William H. Rorer, Inc., 15 Ad. L. Dec. 2d 145 (FTC 1964).
"' Grand Union Co., 13 Ad. L. Dec. 2d 468 (FTC 1963).
" 14 C.F.R. § 302.19-302.20 (1965) (CAB).40 See 29 C.F.R. § 102.118 (1965) (NLRB).
41 17 C.F.R. § 203.1-203.8 (Supp. 1965) (SEC).
4'47 C.F.R. 5 1.311 (1965) (FCC); see Melody Music, Inc., 12 Ad. L. Dec. 2d 800
(FCC 1962).
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discussed elsewhere." The Administrative Conference Committee met
the problem well in formulating its recommendation mentioned
above." Its confidence in the judgment of hearing examiners, operating
within the area of discretion suggested by the Committee, appears
reasonable; moreover, undue amendments of the working paper doc-
trine45 (particularly in the adjudicatory realm) and risks relative to
national security, foreign affairs and trade secret information would
properly be avoided under the Conference's proposal.46
III. THE ADJUDICATIVE PROCESS
A. The Hearing
1. Pre-hearing Conferences Pre-hearing conferences, of course, are
no new device in administrative practice, especially since the Presi-
43 See, e.g., Berger, Discovery in Administrative Proceedings: Why Agencies Should
Catch up With the Courts, 46 A.B.A.J. 74 (1960); Cox, Adherence to the Rules of Evi-
dence and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a Means of Expediting Proceedings, 12 Ad.
L. Rev. 50 (1959); Cramton, Administrative Procedure Reform: The Effects of S. 1663
on the Conduct of Federal Rate Proceedings, 16 Ad. L. Rev. 108, 131-34 (1964); McCauley,
Compulsory and Voluntary Disclosure of Government Files, 13 Ad. L. Rev. 108 (1961).
"See text accompanying notes 34-35 supra.
"This doctrine immunizes the staff work sheets of an agency from disclosure to the
public or to parties or participants in agency proceedings except in extraordinary circum-
stances. The classic development of the doctrine-assiduously followed by a long line of
Attorneys General of the United States-appears in Walkinson, Demands of Congressional
Committees for Executive Papers, 10 Fed. B.J. 103, 223, 319 (1964). There is doubt,
however, that the basis for the doctrine is that the agencies, rather than the courts, are the
arbiters of the "public interest;" this doubt is not too clearly conveyed by the positions of
various Attorneys General. On March 30-April 2, 1965, the House Government Operations
Committee, Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcommittee under the
Chairmanship of Congressman John E. Moss, held hearings upon H.R. 5012 89th Cong., 1st
Sess. (which in substance was approved by the Senate in 1964), a bill to amend 72 Stat.
547 (1958), 5 U.S.C. 5 22 (1958), narrowing the authority of federal officials and agencies
to withhold information and limit the availability of records.
For a painstaking and scholarly review of the "housekeeping" statute, its inapplicability
to the NLRB, and the restrictions which should govern such an agency's assertion of (1)
the working paper doctrine and (2) the withholding of employees' testimony or agency
records, as applied to adjudicatory proceedings, see Judge Hamley's recent opinion in General
Eng'r, Inc. v. NLRB, 341 F.2d 367 (9th Cir. 1965).
4In E. W. Bliss Co. v. United States, 203 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Ohio 1961), a taxpayer
suing the United States moved for the production of certain transmittal letters. The court
held that he was not entitled to the letters, because their production did not appear to be
essential to the proper presentation of his case. The court stated that normally it would com-
pel production if the Government were a party to the suit, but that it would proceed more
slowly in the area of inter-agency advisory opinions. The court quoted with approval the
following language from United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 25 F.R.D. 485, 489
(D.N.J. 1960): "[T]he Government, operating as it does through a hierarchy of agents,
must have the benefit of their full, free advices, and since those advices might well cover
angles of a case which would hamper the Government's action if publicized, normally these
advices should not be turned over to those with interests hostile to that of the Govern-
ment." 203 F. Supp. at 176. See also Coro, Inc. v. FTC, 338 F.2d 149 (Ist Cir. 1964),
holding that a respondent may not attempt by subpoena duces tecum to explore generally
FTC "policies and practices" with respect to the Commission's disposition of other cases in
order to establish discrimination against the respondent.
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dent's Conference on Administrative Procedure in 1953. They in-
creasingly are provided for expressly in amended rules."7
2. Interlocutory Appeals Interlocutory appeals, once a bugaboo in
the path of expedited hearings, are being formally abjured more and
more except in limited situations." Although the FCC does not so
express itself formally, it has inserted a footnote to its rules" as a
means of semi-codifying its past adjudicatory pronouncements ad-
monishing parties not to file interlocutory appeals unless the alleged
defect in the appealed ruling of the presiding officer is fundamental
and affects the conduct of the proceeding. The FTC's procedural
expression is that such appeals are to be limited to "extraordinary
circumstances," a novel drafting touch relieved somewhat by brief
explanation."
3. Disqualification of Presiding Officer Two patterns generally are
followed regarding the disqualification of a presiding officer. The
first is illustrated by the SEC procedure. That agency leaves requests
for disqualification with the examiner (except, of course, as the case
comes before it on the exceptions taken by a party to the hearing
examiner's initial decision), who need not either respond to a request
that he disqualify himself or otherwise give reasons for not doing so
if that is his determination." The second pattern is illustrated by the
FTC approach. In contrast to the SEC, the FTC determines the
matter of an examiner's disqualification as an agency question upon
motion duly made." The practice of the FCC 3 is similar to that of
the FTC. An intermediate position is taken by the NLRB, which
requires the filing of an affidavit and a ruling on the record if the
examiner refuses to disqualify himself.
4. Admissibility of Evidence Two approaches to the admission of
evidence may be observed. The NLRB, for example, provides that "so
47 See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.241, 1.243(h) (1965) (FCC). For an example of a man-
datory pre-hearing conference rule, see 16 C.F.R. § 3.8 (Supp. 1965) (FTC) (pre-hearing
conference must be held if it appears probable to the hearing examiner that a hearing will
extend for more than five days; standards prescribed for the scope of such conference). See
also Uniformity in Rules for Agency Adjudication: A Comparison of the CAB, FTC and
FCC Rules, 14 Ad. L. Rev. 260, 270-71 (1962). In documentary support of the case for
greater uniformity among the agencies in rules of practice and procedure they adopt on
common procedural subjects, see Committee on Uniform Rules for Agency Adjudication,
15 Ad. L. Rev. 167 (1963), and ABA Section of Administrative Law, Annual Reports of
Divisions and Committees, Vol. 1 (1964).
4817 C.F.R. § 201.12 (Supp. 1965) (SEC); 29 C.F.R. § 102.26 (1965) (NLRB).
4947 C.F.R. § 1.301 (1965) (FCC).
'0 16 C.F.R. § 3.20 (Supp. 1965) (FTC).
" 17 C.F.R. § 201.11(c) (1964) (SEC).
5216 C.F.R. § 3.15(g)(2) (Supp. 1965) (FTC).
"a47 C.F.R. § 1.245 (1965) (FCC).
54 29 C.F.R. § 102.37 (1965) (NLRB).
[Vol. 19:239
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far as practicable" the rules of evidence applicable to non-jury trials
in the United States district courts under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure shall control;"5 the ICC and FCC rules are similar.5" With
this probable minority policy may be compared the SEC rules,
57
which restate the pertinent provision of the Administrative Procedure
Act.5" Section 7(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act directs a
policy of excluding irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evi-
dence, and requires that decisions be supported by reliable, probative
and substantial evidence; the section, however, does permit any oral
or documentary evidence to be received. It is significant that the
NLRB and the FCC, the two agencies involved in the greatest num-
ber of administrative appeals"' during fiscal year 1963, have appar-
ently found their adjudicative hearings expedited by closer adherence
to the rules of evidence," thereby maintaining smaller dockets and
shorter hearings. It thus would appear that the unfortunate effects
of the language in Donnelly Garment Co. v. NLRB" have gradually
receded as the need for expedited hearings has been stressed by
Congress, by the information contained in the 1955 and 1962 Final
Reports of the Administrative Conferences called by former Presi-
s5 2 9 C.F.R. § 102.39 (1965) (NLRB).
5"47 C.F.R. § 1.351 (1964) (FCC); 49 C.F.R. § 1.75 (1963) (ICC). See also 39
C.F.R. § 204.16(a) (1962) (Post Office Dep't proceedings involving second-class mailing
privileges).
57 17 C.F.R. § 201.14(a) (1964) (SEC). Quite similar to the SEC approach is that of
the CAB in economic proceedings, 14 C.F.R. § 302.24(b) (1965), of the FTC, 16 C.F.R.
§ 3.14 (Supp. 1965), and of the FPC, 18 C.F.R. § 1.26(a) (1961).
"Administrative Procedure Act § 7(c), 60 Stat. 241 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1006(c)
(1958), which reads in part as follows: "Any oral or documentary evidence may be re-
ceived, but every agency shall as a matter of policy provide for the exclusion of irrelevant,
immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence .. "
" Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts [for Fiscal Year] 1963, at 188 (1964).
"029 C.F.R. § 102.39 (1965) (NLRB); 47 C.F.R. § 1.351 (1965) (FCC).
, 123 F.2d 215 (8th Cir. 1941). In this case the court reversed the Board on grounds
of due process because the examiner had excluded material evidence. The court's opinon
contains such expressions as the following:
In [an earlier case] . . . we expressed the opinion that the practice which
should be followed by a trial examiner in taking evidence and ruling upon
objections to evidence is that which applies to special masters in equity pro-
ceedings, and "that the record should contain all evidence offered by any
party in interest, except such as is palpably incompetent" . . . . If the
record on review contains not only all evidence which was clearly admissible,
but also all evidence of doubtful admissibility, the court which is called upon
to review the case can usually make an end of it, whereas if evidence was ex-
cluded which that court regards as having been admissible, a new trial or re-
hearing cannot be avoided. We say this in the hope of preventing a repetition
of what occurred in the case now before us, and to obviate any misunder-
standing as to what the attitude of this Court is with respect to the taking
of evidence in a hearing before a special master or a trial examiner. Id. at 224.
As a result many examiners, fearing reversal if they excluded testimony, documents or
data other than that which was palpably inadmissible, exercised an abundance of precaution
that contributed to long hearings and voluminous records.
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dents Eisenhower and Kennedy and by the statistics developed over
recent years by the Office of Administrative Procedure in the Depart-
ment of Justice."'
5. Official Notice With respect to official notice, the SEC has
adopted a rule"3 of considerable breadth, excessively so if arbitrarily
applied. The rule permits, in part, the Commission to take official
notice in its decisions of any matter in its public official records. Not-
withstanding the provision that such notice taken of any material
fact will entitle the parties to rebuttal opportunity, the initial breadth
of the provision evidently permits official notice of what Professor
Davis has called "adjudicatory facts"" from any other hearing record
which may be no part of the expert equipment of the agency and be
quite prejudicial to present parties upon whom is cast an undue and
improper burden. The Attorney General's Manual on the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, it should be noted, states that official notice "ex-
tends properly to all matters as to which the agency by reason of its
functions is presumed to be expert, such as technical or scientific facts
within its specialized knowledge." 5 Under the SEC rule, the examiner
must list all matters that are officially noticed&' from the Commission's
files. In contrast to the SEC, the FTC recently ruled that it may take
notice of records in other cases before it involving the same respond-
ent,6 7 a not uncommon practice.
6. "°Written Case" Method Like the swelling tide of pre-hearing
conferences that followed the 19 5 3 President's Conference on Admin-
istrative Procedure, so also has the "written case" method recom-
mended by that Conference reached substantial proportions by either
rule or process." John C. Doerfer, former chairman of the FCC,
explained the pioneering efforts of that agency in this direction at
02 For an extremely comprehensive recent survey, see Staff of Subcomm. on Administra-
tive Practice and Procedure, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., Statistical
Data Related to Administrative Proceedings Conducted by Federal Agencies [for the Fiscal
Year] 1963 (Comm. Print. 1964).
03 17 C.F.R. § 201.14(d) (Supp. 1965) (SEC).
641 Davis, Administrative Law §§ 7.02, 15.03 (1958).
°5Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 80 (1947).
17 C.F.R. §§ 201.20(a) (1) (iv) and (x) (1964), 201.20 (a) (3) (1964), 201.20(a)-
(4) (Supp. 1965) (SEC).
67Bakers of Washington, Inc., 15 Ad. L. Dec. 2d 334 (FTC 1964). But see NLRB v.
Johnson, 310 F.2d 550 (6th Cir. 1962), holding such practice to be erroneous unless the
employer is afforded an opportunity to make a contrary showing (although NLRB upheld
on the basis of other independent evidence showing commission of unfair labor practice by
respondent-employer).
6"Examples in point are 14 C.F.R. §§ 302.23(a), 302.24(f)-(h) (1965) (CAB); 47
C.F.R. § 1.251(d) (1965) (FCC); 49 C.F.R. § 1.77 (1963) (ICC) (providing for the
admissibility of prepared statements not inclusive of argument). This is not to say, however,
that verification and cross examination are precluded.
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an Institute conducted by the Administrative Law Section of the
American Bar Association in late 1958 in this manner:
At the pre-hearing conferences . . . the parties . .. shall be prepared
to discuss the advisability of reducing any or all phases of their affirma-
tive direct cases to written form. Where it appears that it will conduce
significantly to the disposition of the proceeding for the parties to sub-
mit any portion of their cases in writing, it is the policy of the Com-
mission to encourage them to do so. However, the phase or phases of
the proceeding to be submitted in writing, the dates for the exchange
of the written material, and other procedural limitations upon the
effect of adopting the written case procedure (such as, whether material
ruled out as incompetent may be restored by competent oral testimony)
is to be left to agreements of the parties as approved by the Hearing
Examiner .. .9
As is implied above, the written case procedure has rested largely
upon a consent basis. The Administrative Conference of the United
States, in its Recommendation No. 19 dealing with formal rate hear-
ings, strongly advocated that rate applicants be required "to the extent
permitted by law" to submit their cases on a written basis and be
limited in cross examination to interrogation which "would make a
useful contribution.""0 Section 7 (c) of the Administrative Procedure
Act 1 relaxes the hearing requirements with respect to initial licensing
and rule-making on the record (such as rate hearings) by permitting
the receipt of evidence in written form, but it is subject to the ex-
press condition that the interest of any party shall not be prejudiced
thereby. The Conference explained that its recommendation (not all
of which is reflected above) would afford relief to the problem of
delay in rate-making."
It is an obvious fact that much actual "trial" hearing time is saved
under the written case method; however, this does not necessarily con-
69 Doerfer, The Pre-Hearing Conference in Hearings on Comparative Broadcast Applica-
tions Before the Federal Communications Commission, 11 Ad. L. Rev. 122, 128 (1958).
" Final Report of the Administrative Conference of the United States at Appendix IV
(Dec. 15, 1962).
7' 60 Stat. 241 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1006(c) (1958).
7 Final Report of the Administrative Conference of the United States 15-16 (Dec. 15,
1962). In a current analytical and statistical study by Stuart Nagel and Constantine
Curris entitled The Exercise of Procedural Discretion by the Regulatory Agencies, evaluating
data collected in the so-called Dawson Committee Survey (Staff of the House Committee
on Government Operations, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., Survey and Study of Administrative
Organization, Procedure and Practice in the Federal Agencies, Comm. Print 1957), three
interesting inferences emerge. 17 Ad. L. Rev. 173, 181-83 (1965). Thus, a table con-
structed to compare the relation between oral presentation and length of adjudication
proceedings revealed that the FTC which had instituted a procedure of not allowing
oral testimony had "relatively long examiner proceedings", whereas "five of the six
[regulatory] agencies that allow oral evidence had relatively short trial examiner pro-
ceedings". Id. at 181. It was also found that agency encouragement of prehearing con-
ferences tended to hold down backlogs of proceedings, as did delegation of larger dis-
cretion to hearing examiners over proceedings. Id. at 182-83.
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serve actual hearing process time because the exchange of exhibits
can cause more delay than the actual examination of witnesses. More-
over, no matter how religiously the rules may admonish against con-
clusionary, argumentative or self-serving matter in the exhibits, it
takes more imagination and less experience to expect Utopia in
adjudication; the brand of cynic need not be accepted if the presence
of unsifted data for argument on the issues is foreseen. Unlike the
examiner, the agency on review deals with a paper record which, if
unsifted in this respect, will increase the review workload.
7. Submission of Proposed Findings and Conclusions Agency rules
generally provide for the submission of proposed findings and con-
clusions to the presiding officer when a hearing has been completed."
Generally, the agencies have made no provision for the time in which
proposed findings and conclusions must be filed. An exception is the
SEC.'4 That agency also permits the filing of briefs in support of
proposed findings, but declares that a proposed finding not supported
by briefs is waived."5
Most of the rules contemplate a ruling by the examiner upon the
findings and conclusions as a part of the record, at least insofar as
they are material to the issues."8 However, uncertainty is introduced
by the FTC provision which exempts matters on which the examiner's
decision "otherwise informs the parties of the action taken by him
thereon.""' But this ambiguity is minor compared with the court-like
position assumed by the ICC, whose applicable rule permits an ex-
aminer to announce an oral decision and to cause the prevailing party
to prepare the recommended order or report."
8. Oral Argument Generally, oral argument is either a matter of
right or-much more frequently-within agency discretion. Under
the NLRB rules, for example, a party is entitled to oral argument
7317 C.F.R. § 201.16(e) (Supp. 1965) (SEC); 29 C.F.R. 5 102.42 (1965) (NLRB);
47 C.F.R. § 1.263-1.264 (1965) (FCC).
74 17 C.F.R. § 201.16(e) (Supp. 1965) (SEC) (left to hearing officer's discretion, sub-
ject to first filing being made within at least sixty days after close of hearing).
75 17 C.F.R. § 201.16(d) (1964) (SEC).
"°See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 1.267(b) (1965) (FCC).
7 16 C.F.R. 53.19 (Supp. 1965) (FTC).
7849 C.F.R. 55 1.241 (f) (1963), 1.247(h) (Supp. 1965); for similar rules of the Post
Office Department, see 39 C.F.R. 55 201.24(c), 203.12-203.13 (1962). Compare Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act § 8(b), 60 Stat. 242 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1007(b) (1958). In
contrast, recently the FCC Review Board (discussed in text accompanying notes 152-66
infra) firmly denounced and invalidated an initial decision of an examiner rendered under
similar circumstances. Muncie Broadcasting Corp., 15 Ad. L. Dec. 2d 329 (FCC 1964). Al-
though the hearing proceeded upon a written case basis, the examiner obtained no waiver
of the rights to file proposed findings and conclusions conferred by both the Administrative
Procedure Act § 8(b), 60 Stat. 242 (1946), 5 U.S.C. 5 1007(b) (1958), and the FCC
rules, 47 C.F.R. § 1.263(a) (1965).
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before the presiding officer at the close of the case."9 Under the FCC
rules, however, such argument is discretionary." It is probable
that hearing examiners allow oral argument whenever it can serve a
useful purpose."'
A general reason for favoring the NLRB type of rule is its recog-
nition as a matter of policy that closing arguments tend to crystallize
the important issues in and other features of the particular case
through emphasis and summation after all the evidence is in; on re-
view, an agency benefits greatly from such arguments as preserved
in the record. It must be remembered that the closing stage of the
hearing before the examiner quite often, if not usually, is the termi-
nus for both physical appearance and argument of the parties and
their counsel. Oral argument before the examiner serves the additional
functions of (1) tying the case together before the examiner writes
his decision and, more important, (2) causing him to review the
proposed findings and conclusions in advance of argument and then
through questioning to bring additional light to bear on the conflicts
usually presented by the evidence.
Frequently, exceptions to initial decisions are little more than para-
phrases of the proposed findings and conclusions which are submitted
to the examiner but which are not adopted in substance by him in
his recommended or initial decision; this is particularly true when
recommended or initial decisions are essentially narratives of the
examiner's findings and conclusions, rather than sharp analyses and
reasoning addressed to the submissions on the issues."5 It would seem,
79 29 C.F.R. § 102.42 (1965) (NLRB).
so 47 C.F.R. § 1.277(c) (1965) (FCC).
81 The FTC rules make no reference to such argument. See 16 C.F.R. § 3.19 (Supp.
1965). With the SEC the matter is made completely discretionary. 17 C.F.R. § 201.16(g)
(Supp. 1965). The FPC permits oral arguments under stated guidelines. 18 C.F.R. S
1.29(b) (1961). By implication the ICC permits argument upon reasonable request. 49
C.F.R. § 1.88 (1963). Although the Administrative Procedure Act provides for the op-
portunity to file proposed findings and conclusions and supporting reasons therefor, it does
not require the agencies to make provision for oral argument. Act S 8 (b), 60 Stat. 242
(1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1007(b) (1958). The act also requires rulings upon the proposed find-
ings and conclusions presented. Ibid.
" In the case of the FCC, the narrative approach that has often been followed in initial
decisions may very well trace to a mistaken pronouncement of the Commission itself in
Lyman C. Brown Enterprises, 7 Radio Rep. 1272, 1284 (1953): "The Administrative Pro-
cedure Act does not require the Examiner to make and show her ruling upon each proposed
finding and conclusion, when, as is the practice of the Commission, all exceptions to an
Initial Decision are ruled upon individually and specifically."
True, the examiner need not rule upon every proposed finding that he rejects; a residuum
of quasi-judicial discretion permits him to reject summarily those that are neither material
nor relevant, but he should rule upon the others. The Administrative Procedure Act so re-
quires. Section 8(b), 60 Stat. 242 (1946), 5 U.S.C. S 1007(b) (1958). Certainly the ex-
pression of the Commission quoted above finds no support in law; in fact it is directly con-
trary to the views of the Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
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therefore, that the adjudicative product could be improved considera-
bly (1) by adhering strictly to the Administrative Procedure Acte'
by specifically ruling upon proposed findings and conclusions (there-
by eliminating the indefinite thread of "implicit" rulings common
in narrative initial decisions) and (2) by holding oral arguments
prior to the initial decision, except in proceedings which present no
substantial areas of conflict.
9. Modified Procedure One matter for proper agency concern is that
of fruitless hearings, e.g., held upon contentions of parties that lack
substance. The line is not easy to draw as to when an agency may re-
fuse to grant a hearing provided by statute on the ground that no use-
ful purpose could be accomplished thereby because a true issue of ma-
terial fact has not been presented by the individual who seeks an
opportunity to present evidence in a formal proceeding. Dismissals
of such requests have been upheld on de minimis grounds, but in a
narrow range." Oral argument before the agency to determine
whether a factual or legal issue should be developed in a hearing has
been approved in a restrictive manner."5 It is established, of course,
that issues of fact need not be heard that in effect challenge the
validity of an authorized substantive regulation. But since the agencies
act chiefly on a flexible basis, the solace of the authorized rule is
often not available because they have not seen fit to promulgate the
permissible rules.
Recently some attention has been directed toward a form of
"modified procedure" under which the agency, if it determines that
no material question of fact has been raised, refuses in part or
absolutely to extend the usual due process hearing rights to those
claiming them. At once two problems appear: Is a constitutional or
statutory right to a full hearing violated, and how much discretion
does the agency thereby vest in itself-if reasonably applied today,
may it be quo vadis tomorrow?
" Act § 8(b), 60 Stat. 242 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1007(b) (1958).
84FCC v. WJB, The Goodwill Station, Inc., 337 U.S. 265 (1949); Superior Oil Co. v.
FPC, 322 F.2d 601, 609 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 922 (1964); Interstate
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 285 F.2d 270 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Red River Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 267 F.2d 653 (D.C. Cir. 1956). A local United States district court rule that
permits only the movant for summary judgment to request oral argument on the
motion is invalid, as too inflexible to meet the varying requirements of due process pre-
sented by differing circumstances. Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456 (9th Cir. 1964),
reversing and remanding the decision of a federal district court that granted summary
judgment on the motion of the Government, without oral argument, such judgment
denying plaintiff's petition for review, by injunction and declaratory judgment, of an
Interior Department decision invalidating plaintiff's mining claims on the ground there
had been no valid discovery of minerals.
SFederal Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 239 F.'2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Harbenita Broad-
casting Co. v. FCC, 218 F.2d 28 (D.C. Cir. 1954); cf. Elm City Broadcasting Co. v. United
States, 235 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
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If used with care, there is reason to believe that the long-term
objective of eliminating excessive adjudicative delays may be realized
more practically by studying closely the summary judgment of the
courts. Much may be said in behalf of the summary judgment pro-
cedure. Hearings should not be held needlessly. Pleadings may dis-
close no issuable proceeding if they rest upon allegations in non-
conformance to the law or upon established substantive regulations,
or if on their face they raise no substantial question of fact. In the
latter category, however, quagmires of doubt assail the agency staff
because it recognizes that court reversals of agency orders are based
normally on procedural defects and rarely on errors of substance. Yet
important progress could be made if (1) more pleadings in support
of applications were required to be submitted in affidavit form and
(2) the agencies were given discretion to require that the allega-
tions contained in pleadings so filed must be verified by persons
having knowledge of the facts and not rest upon the quicksand of
information and belief. In this connection one of the 1960 amend-
ments to the Federal Communications Act offers a most practical
model, although it is confined to only a single area of FCC activity-
the handling of protests (usually by existing licensees) to the grant-
ing of radio station applications." Obviously, if both verification and
affidavit are required, the pleader will give considerable thought to
the substantiality of the facts he may prudently allege. If provisions
of this kind do not assist in removing cases on the borderline as to
whether substantial questions of fact have been presented requiring a
hearing, it is suggested that such cases could be ordered (by provision
in procedural rules) to a pre-hearing conference before an examiner,
to whom power would be delegated to dismiss upon a finding of
insubstantiality. This suggested procedure would be effectuated par-
tially by legislative provision and partially by administrative rule.
Several of the agencies have taken steps in the direction of utilizing
modified procedures. The FTC, for example, provides for specificity
in the complaint and answer; if specificity is lacking, the effect is
one of admission.87 The SEC provisions are similar.8 Also significant
is that in addition to defining "modified procedure,"'" the ICC pro-
vides for verified pleadings and personal knowledge of facts."
88 Federal Communications Act of 1934, § 309, 48 Stat. 1085, as amended, 47 U.S.C.
5 309(d)-(e) (Supp. IV, 1963). The FCC rules also provide for the simple waiver of
hearing by consent of all parties, a procedure that has not been employed to date, so far as
can be discovered. 47 C.F.R. § 1.603 (1965) (see subsection (e) thereof prescribing the
form of waiver to be used).87 16 C.F.R. § 3.4-3.5, especially 5 3.5(b) (1) (ii) (Supp. 1965) (FTC).
88 17 C.F.R. § 201.7, especially (c) (1964) (SEC).
8949 C.F.R. § 1.5(k) (1963) (ICC).
9049 C.F.R. S 1.50 (1963) (ICC).
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Unfortunately, however, at least two agencies appear to have
attempted by procedural rules to eliminate hearings under circum-
stances that would not fall within the concept of the summary judg-
ment adhered to by the courts; this situation is created by the failure
of these agencies to provide reasonable administrative standards for
the granting vel non of a hearing. The ICC retains discretionary
power to determine what oral evidence may be introduced"' and
whether the facts are material enough to warrant a hearing for the
sole purpose of cross examination.9 The opportunity for arbitrary
action and process under these rules (especially the latter) suggests
the conclusion that the ICC could trespass upon the minimum pro-
cedures of the Administrative Procedure Act; 3 moreover, basic con-
cepts of fairness would seem to require provision for more specific
standards in its rules for "modified procedure."" Similarly, the NLRB
provides that in consent election agreement cases,9' the Board may
either decide the exceptions or objections forthwith, or require a
hearing if it believes that the exceptions raise substantial or material
fact issues;" if such proceedings are consolidated with unfair labor
practices proceedings, however, the usual hearing provisions7 apply.9
These agencies, then, have not attempted to formulate reasonable,
objective rules for determining what constitutes a sufficiently sub-
stantial factual dispute to justify a hearing; instead, rules leave the
ordering of hearings to the unrestricted discretion of the respective
agencies, which support such rules by substituting a "modified pro-
cedure" short of a hearing in those cases involving factual disputes
not considered substantial.
B. The Agency Decision
The rules provide generally for the filing of exceptions and other
pleadings (such as supporting briefs) directed to the examiner's initial
or recommended decision. " Time periods for such filings are pre-
9549 C.F.R. § 1.53(b) (1963) (ICC).
9249 C.F.R. § 1.53 (a) (Supp. 1965) (ICC).
93 Sections 5, 7-8, 60 Stat. 240 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1004, 1006-07 (1958).
"4See also 49 C.F.R. §§ 1.53 (a) (modified procedure), (protests) 1.240(c) (4) (Supp.
1965) (IC1).
" 29 C.F.R. 5 102.62 (1965) (NLRB).
62 9 C.F.R. 5 102.69(e)(1) (1965) (NLRB).07 29 C.F.R. 102.46 (1965) (NLRB).
9s29 C.F.R. 5 102.69(e) (1) (1965) (NLRB) (proviso).
" It is fairly common among the agencies to require specificity in the statement of ex-
ceptions, supported by page references to the hearing. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 102.46(b)
(1965) (NLRB). See also Izzi Trucking Co., 16 Ad. L. Dec. 2d 420 (NLRB 1964), holding
that the right to except to the decision of the trial examiner was waived by failure to ex-
cept with the specificity required by the rules, and that under NLRB rules, 29 C.F.R.
5 102.48 (a) (1965) (NLRB), the examiner's decision becomes final if no proper exceptions
are taken.
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scribed more frequently than in the case of proposed findings and
conclusions." The SEC provision seems to be the shortest. 1
A division exists among the agencies on the important question
whether oral argument before the adjudicatory agency upon a party's
request should be provided for by rule, since agency statutes gen-
erally do not confer this right upon parties to a proceeding. The FTC1°"
and the SEC"' apparently extend this right as a matter of practice.
The SEC dispenses with oral argument only if extraordinary circum-
stances make it "impracticable or inadvisable." 1" The FTC can
refuse oral argument if it "otherwise orders.'" Allowance of argu-
ment is discretionary with the NLRB' and the ICC. °' For no parti-
cular understandable reason, the FCC permits oral argument in inter-
locutory pleading contests if the agency views the "ends of justice" as
being "best served thereby," ' while retaining full discretion over
allowing oral argument in the more significant later phase of final
decision in the proceeding;' apparently, the same situation exists
when the agency's review board11 acts pursuant to delegated author-
ity as the appellate tribunal.
The NLRB specifies by rule that its review of a finding of fact
by the examiner is tested by whether the finding " is contrary to a
preponderance of the evidence.''. The provision is salutary in draw-
ing direct attention to the importance of the examiner's fact finding,
consequent upon an actual hearing of the evidence.
C. Agency Review
This title is subordinate to the one preceding. However, separate
treatment seems warranted because of recent acts of Congress (and
procedural provisions that may be expected to follow) which vest
discretion in certain agencies to review adjudicatory decisions through
subordinates.1 '
100 See text immediately preceding and accompanying note 74 supra.
'1 17 C.F.R. § 201.17(b) and (e) (Supp. 1965) (SEC) (fifteen days for filing ex-
ceptions, thirty additional days for filing supporting briefs after Commission orders review).
Prior to amendments in 1964, the SEC allowed only ten days for filing exceptions and ten
additional days for filing supporting briefs. 17 C.F.R. § 201.17(a)-(b) (1964).
102 16 C.F.R. § 3.22(f) (Supp. 1965) (FTC).
103 17 C.F.R. § 201.21(a) (Supp. 1965) (SEC).
104 Ibid.
105 16 C.F.R. § 3.22(f) (Supp. 1965) (FTC).
106 29 C.F.R. § 102.46(i) (1965) (NLRB).
10749 C.F.R. § 1.98 (1963) (ICC).
1047 C.F.R. § 1.297 (1965) (FCC).
0947 C.F.R. § 1.277(c) (1965) (FCC);
..0 Discussed in text accompanying notes 152-66 infra.
111 29 C.F.R. § 102.48(c) (1965) (NLRB).
112 Federal Communications Act of 1934, § 5(d) (1) and (8), 48 Stat. 1068, as amend-
ed, 47 U.S.C. § 155(d) (1) and (8) (Supp. IV, 1963); Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1961,
26 Fed. Reg. 6191 (1961); Reorganization Plan No. 7 of 1961, 26 Fed. Reg. 7315 (1961);
Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1961, 26 Fed. Reg. 5989 (1961).
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No better initial reference point exists than an article written by
the Committee on Agency Adjudication of the Administrative Law
Section of the American Bar Association."' It comprises an early study,
background exposition and analysis of the actual and proposed pro-
cedural changes to accommodate heavy regulatory workloads and to
encourage time emphasis upon major policy. What is said below sup-
plements, with particular consideration of the FCC experience, the
discussion in that article.
1. Delegation of Responsibility There is general agreement that
necessity exists for enabling agency heads to deliberate at greater
length on matters of importance and to supplement such deliberation
with affirmative regulation. Less unanimity, however, exists as to
method of accomplishing this result, and no doubt it is too soon after
the 1962 Committee article mentioned above to add to its conclusion
that data are inadequate to provide the bases for conclusions.
A preliminary factor often disregarded is the present opportunity
for the agencies to delegate their informal administrative (as dis-
tinguished from rulemaking"4 and formal adjudicative"') duties and
responsibilities in a broad way, if accompanied by standards for their
exercise. With a few agency exceptions, a large quantity of the work
of the agencies falls within an informal administrative "processing"
classification; thus, ordinarily there are means at hand to confer re-
sponsibility for action upon bureau supervisors and other staff per-
sonnel."' The Hector.. and Minnow"' resignation letters, and any
expressions of opinions preceding those, tend to fasten upon the
formal adjudicative process as the great offender, while showing there
has been all too little delegation of administrative authority. So
long as the boards and commissions insist upon personal review in
myopic detail, important adjudications in pending matters and the
113 Comm. on Agency Adjudication, ABA Section on Administrative Law, Progress and
Problems in Agency Adjudications, 14 Ad. L. Rev. 239 (1962).
"' Administrative Procedure Act § 4, 60 Stat. 238 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1003 (1958).
"' Administrative Procedure Act §§ 5, 7-8, 60 Stat. 239 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1004,
1006-07 (1958).
11 In this regard, consider the remarks of ICC Commisshner Arpaia with respect to the
excessive detail of one ICC Commissioner's duties. Arpaia, The Attitude of the Several Forms
of Transportation Toward Regulation, 20 ICC Prac. J. 853 (1953), quoted in part in Davis,
Administrative Law: Cases-Text-Problems 207 (1960).
"1 See Hector, Problems of the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Independent Regulatory
Commissions, memorandum to President Eisenhower, Sept. 10, 1959, pp. 1-2, 66-75, ex-
cerpted in Gellhorn & Byse, Administrative Law-Cases and Comments 56-62 (4th ed.
1960).
.1. Minow, Suggestions for Improvement of the Administrative Process, 15 Ad. L. Rev.
146 (1963) (reproduction of text of resignation letter to President).
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entire rule-making process will lag behind the more ministerial mat-
ters that could be delegated in volume.'19
The SEC has made a determined and intelligent effort to use its
power of administrative delegation. It is true that the nature of its
functions may have been of some compulsive force in the initiation
of such delegations. Reference to its rules of organization" demon-
strates the extent of delegation to directors of divisions, regional ad-
ministrators and the Secretary of the Commission. Indicative are
such delegations as (1) the power to determine a hearing is un-
necessary on applications for certain orders if they do not appear to
the director "to present issues not previously settled by the Com-
mission or to raise questions of fact or policy indicating that the
public interest or the interest of investors requires that a hearing be
held. . . ";".. (2) the power to conduct investigations and subpoena
witnesses in certain classes of investigations;.2 and (3) the enumera-
tion of certain powers delegated to regional administrators, followed
by the guiding caveat: "Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing,
in any case in which the Regional Administrator believes it appropri-
ate, he may submit the matter to the Commission.""
"9 As stated by Harold G. Cowgill, former Chief of the FCC Broadcast Bureau, in a
panel discussion concerning Administrative Process Problems before the House Special Sub-
committee on Legislative Oversight, June 16, 1959:
The role of the staff may be described as the two-fold function of furnish-
ing the Commissioners with information they need in determining policy and
deciding individual cases, and, second, of performing the daily tasks involved
in carrying out the decisions made by the Commissioners.
Insofar as the staff functions as a source of information to the Commission
it operates differently in assisting the Commissioners with their broad policy
making function than in the aid it renders to the Commissioners in their ad-
judicatory capacity. With regard to the policy making and rule making work
of the Commissioners the staff serves principally as a source of information.
To a large extent this takes the form of technical data and studies-principally
engineering, legal and economic. The staff also assembles for the Commissioners
analyses of the experience of the Commission in particular fields, as related to
the problem in hand, whether it be a question of substantive policy or pro-
cedural methods.
The adjudicatory process involves additional requirements. In its broader
sense this process involves all the licensing activities of the Commission in-
cluding actions taken without prior hearing as well as decisions made after
hearing on applications for Commission authorizations. Here again, in closely
circumscribed areas such as the authorization of minor modifications of radio
station licenses and certain types of authorizations for the conduct of common
carrier operations, the staff has delegated authority to act in strict accordance
with well-defined policy. In all cases involving any doubt as to the clear and
direct applicability of established policies or rules the staff refers the matter
to the Commissioners even in cases which might be technically regarded as
coming within the scope of staff delegations.
12017 C.F.R. §§ 200.30-1 - 200.30-2, 200.30-6 - 200.30-7 (Supp. 1965), 200.30-3-
200.30-5 (1964) (SEC).
'2 17 C.F.R. § 200.30-2(b)(1) (Supp. 1965).
12217 C.F.R. § 200.30-3(a)(1) (1964).
12 17 C.F.R. § 200.30-4(d) (1964).
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2. Independence of the Presiding Officer A factor of concern in
proposed and recently enacted statutes related to adjudicatory dele-
gations is the resulting status of the "independent" examiner. His
real independence may have been overstressed; but there can be no
question that the public and the bar obtain assurance and confidence
from a system of administrative adjudication in which opportunity
exists to present evidence to a presiding officer insulated from the
exercise of political, philosophical or personal influence within or
without the agency, binding administrative rule or precedent ex-
cepted. Because public trust is essential to effective government
regulation, it is important that delegation of agency appellate au-
thority to employees not affect the examiner's independence and
stature.124 In this regard, it is significant that certain agencies, such
as the FTC and the CAB, operating under more broadly drawn dele-
gational statutes'" (relative to adjudication) than that applying to
the FCC," could jeopardize the status of the hearing examiner by
placing appeals from his decisions in the hands of employee boards
of lesser status, capacity, experience and compensation. Of course,
any agency delegations to employees of the power to review examiners'
decisions will lessen to an extent the status of the hearing examiner
as the sole deciding officer (except for the agency members them-
selves). However, the FCC statutory delegation language, for rea-
sons explained more fully elsewhere, ' is more balanced by far in its
recognition of the semi-independent examiner status contemplated by
the Administrative Procedure Act ..8 than the delegation language
appearing in the Congressionally approved reorganization plans for
the FTC and CAB. '
3. Agency Certiorari In 1961 the FTC embarked upon a certiorari
procedure, under which review as of right from an initial decision
was abolished and discretion was provided in the FTC to entertain
review as it saw fit.24 In 1963, however, it returned to its original
2 It would seem that the NLRB rules may point the way toward a presumption in
favor of the examiner's findings of fact. See 29 C.F.R. § 102.48 (c) (1965) (NLRB). Con-
versely, one could quarrel with the excessive interlocutory appeals permitted by the FCC.
... Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1961, 26 Fed. Reg. 6191 (1961), quoted in ABA Sec-
tion of Administrative Law Comm. on Agency Adjudication, Progress and Problems in
Agency Adjudications, 14 Ad. L. Rev. 239, at 241 (1962); Reorganization Plan No. 3 of
1961, 26 Fed. Reg. 5989 (1961).
' The FCC amendments require the Commission to pass upon applications for review
from decisions of its employee review board. Federal Communications Act of 1934, § 5,
48 Stat. 1068, as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 155(d) (1) and (8) (Supp. IV, 1963).
1 See text accompanying notes 152-55 infra.
'2'60 Stat. 237 (1946), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 1001 (1958).
129 See note 112 supra.
0 See Comm. on Agency Adjudication, ABA Section on Administrative Law, Progress
and Problems in Agency Adjudications, 14 Ad. L. Rev. 239, 242-43 (1962).
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procedure whereby review of an initial decision was permitted as a
matter of right;"' in so doing the agency abandoned the complete
discretion (which, of course, is the application of certiorari policy)
reserved to itself to determine when it would review an examiner's
decision.
The CAB has adopted a certiorari policy governed by standards
set forth that control the type of case it will review upon exception
taken to the examiner's decision; the promulgated rule expressly states
that the CAB will apply these standards in its "sound discretion....2
The SEC cannot be classified as an agency which pursues the cer-
tiorari policy, because it provides standards for review of initial
decisions when requested and assures the petitioner that it "will order
review" if his petition complies with the standards.' Thus, the element
of choice, inherent in the certiorari policy, is not present. Of course,
as with all agencies, the SEC reserves the right to review on its own
initiative. " The FCC, in addition to providing standards by rule, is
required by statute to entertain petitions for review; hence, again the
certiorari element appears wanting.3 ' As might be anticipated from
its liberal policy toward oral argument, the NLRB makes no use of
the certiorari procedure in unfair labor practice cases,' "' as distin-
guished from representation and certification cases.""
Other agencies, apparently in the majority, have not adopted the
certiorari policy, perhaps in some instances due to lack of statu-
tory authority. In contrast, the ICC has provided for the right to
apply or petition for review from divisions or appeals boards under
certain conditions. In the case of the ICC, for example, the condi-
tions take the form of declaring the decisions of divisions final unless
'1 16 C.F.R. 5 3.22(a) (Supp. 1965) (FTC).
'32 14 C.F.R. 5302.28 (1965) (CAB).
13317 C.F.R. 5 201.17(d) (Supp. 1965). The standards set forth in the SEC rules
are comparable to those of the FCC regarding their sensitivity to the classes of proceedings
and character of problems which the agency itself should determine for the greater fulfill-
ment of the design of the statute. For example, the SEC commits itself to review examiners'
decisions which order (1) suspension, denial or withdrawal of any registration; (2) sus-
pension or expulsion of a member of a national securities exchange; (3) suspension, denial
or revocation of broker-dealer registrations; or (4) suspension of trading on an exchange.
17 C.F.R. § 201.17(d)(1)(i)-(iii) (Supp. 1965). In addition, as has been observed, the
SEC provides that it will review depending upon the character of the problem. It, however,
precludes itself from summarily affirming the initial decision in such a case. 17 C.F.R.
S 201.17(d), last para. (1964). See also 17 C.F.R. 5§ 201.17(a)-(c), d(2)(i) (Supp.
1965).
'317 C.F.R. § 201.27(d) (1964). It should be noted that the SEC amended its
rules effective August 1, 1964, to permit hearing officers to make initial decisions rather
than recommended decisions. 17 C.F.R. 5 200.30-7 (Supp. 1965).
135 See note 126 supra.
'3'29 C.F.R. § 102.48 (1965) (NLRB).
13729 C.F.R. § 102.67(c) (1965) (NLRB). Under this rule, a certiorari policy accom-
panied by broad standards applies.
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(1) they involve matters of general transportation policy, (2) the
initial decision was reversed or modified or (3) the division made the
initial decision." 8 In practical effect, however, it would seem that
the ICC has reduced the review as of right to questions of "general
transportation importance" found by the entire Commission on its
own motion to exist.'39 Under these circumstances, then, petitions for
review as of right appear to be most limited in ICC proceedings."'
The ICC's procedural rule of finality was recently held by a
federal district court to have been properly applied to pending cases. '
In another case,14 2 the ICC was permitted to rest upon an affirmance
of the original decision by one of its divisions, even though on sub-
sequent reconsideration the division had reversed that decision; the
district court said that the ICC need not state findings of its own.
The latter decision procedurally may be free of criticism, but the
court's reasoning that a contrary view would invite prying into the
mental processes of the ICC is unsound. The court's reliance upon
Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. United States" for such reasoning seems mis-
placed, because the opinion in the case was concerned with the
Commission's weighing of the evidence and with its findings- not
with testimony of an official as to why he voted in a certain man-
ner.'" Adoption by the ICC of the division's earlier findings as its
own indicates that its reasoning is sufficient, and this should be an
end to the legal issue, although from a policy standpoint it would
seem preferable for the ICC to deal more explicitly with a matter
before it as one of "general transportation importance."
It has been noted that recent statutes' 4' have pointed the way
toward delegation of decisional power in adjudicatory hearings, and
that these statutes are not uniform in specifying the matters to be
delegated or the standards, if any, imposed to reserve final adjudica-
tory power in the agency with respect to questions of substantial
'3s49 C.F.R. § 1.101(a)(2) (1963) (ICC).
"a949 C.F.R. § 1.101(a)(3) (1963) (ICC).
'" A position contrary to that of the ICC was taken by the Administrative Confer-
ence of the United States in 1962 in adopting its Recommendation No, 9, Administrative
Conference of the United States, Report of the Third Plenary Session 1-3 (April 3, 1962).
In so acting, it strongly suggested that "review of initial decisions shall not be refused
when there is a reasonable showing of the stated grounds for review." Fuchs, The Adminis-
trative Conference of the United States, 15 Ad. L. Rev. 6, 11 (1963).
141 Keystone Motor Express, Inc. v. United States, 228 F. Supp. 793 (S.D. W.Va. 1964).
1" Curtis, Inc. v. United States, 225 F. Supp. 894 (D. Colo. 1964).
'43298 U.S. 349 (1936).
" The Court in Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. United States stated the following: "Appellants'
claim that the order rests exclusively upon the southern lines' financial needs is negatived
by the record. Many other facts were shown to have been presented and considered. There
is no requirement that the commission specify the weight given to any item of evidence
or fact .. " 298 U.S. 349, 359 (1936).
145 See note 112 supra.
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regulatory importance." Agencies are not noted for pronouncing im-
portant policy through rule-making, and much wider use is made
of the adjudicatory proceeding for this purpose. It is suggested, there-
fore, that preferably the parties in such a proceeding should have the
statutory right to obtain review of those questions for the solution
of which the agency was primarily constituted; failing this,147 the
statute should at least require the agency to promulgate by rule to
the greatest extent practicable the standards which identify the
kinds or classes of adjudicatory proceedings it will permit to be
brought before it by application or petition for review of an other-
wise final action by a subordinate panel, division of the agency's
membership, an examiner or an employee review board.14 Certain
of these standards applied by the ICC and NLRB have been set
out above,' those of the ICC being at once the most vague and
restrictive.'
One further suggestion is in order. If the agencies are to be
clothed with authority to divest themselves of major adjudicatory
functions, the delegate should be required to grant oral argument
upon request of a party. Rarely is this right provided for in relevant
rules. Special delegational authorizations-responsive, to the plight of
the submerged agency unable to perform its multiple regulatory
functions-scarcely were designed to free the agency's delegate, oper-
ating in a much narrower area, from the granting of oral arguments
as an aid to adjudication.51
4. The FCC Review Board Technique The FCC Review Board ex-
periment is a good illustration of Congressional recognition of the
examiner's status and of Commission development of standards for
the delegation of review of adjudicatory proceedings.' Section
146 See text accompanying notes 112-26 supra.
147 Compare the broad language of the FTC and CAB Reorganization Plans, supra note
112.
148 Upon denial of administrative review of an examiner's decision by the Appeals
Council of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, that decision became the
decision of the Secretary and was judicially reviewable. Wettles v. Celebrezze, 228 F. Supp.
17 (E.D.S.C. 1964).
149 See text accompanying notes 138-44 supra.
' °See text accompanying notes 138-44 supra. See also Arizona v. United States, 220
F. Supp. 337 (D. Ariz. 1963), for a brusque treatment of the contention that ICC division
action should not be final merely because the ICC itself said the proceedings were not of
general transportation importance.
... But see the FCC's recently expressed position to the contrary. Hearings on S. 1663
Before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Committee
on the judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 512 (1964). The FCC gave no reason for assuming
this position.
.52 For a succinct consideration of appropriate methods for limiting a regulatory agency's
review, based, however, on appropriate standards to govern the limitations, see Rosenblum
& Smalley, Limitations on Agency Review: The Proposed NLRB Rules, 13 Ad. L. Rev.
155 (1961). The reverse side of the coin is presented by the "judicial" and "legislative"
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5 (d) .' of the Federal Communications Act of 1934 was amended
in 1961 to authorize the FCC to create a board of its employees to
which the Commission's adjudicatory functions, with one exception,
could be delegated; the exception is the holding of a hearing, as dis-
tinguished from "appellate" review of an examiner's initial decision.
Several quasi-standards are embodied in the amendment. First, any
person aggrieved by the action of such a board can apply to the Com-
mission for review and obtain Commission action on such applica-
tion. Second, the board of employees must consist of at least three
members who must be qualified by training, exprience and com-
petence to act as reviewing officers. They must perform no duties in-
consistent with their reviewing functions, and they must be classified
by title or salary commensurate with their "important duties" and in
no event below the level of the examiners whose decisions they review.
Finally, the board members must work on cases in rotation to the
extent practicable, and they must be beyond the supervision of any
officer or employee engaged in performing investigative or prose-
cuting functions for any agency.
In some measure these characteristics, significantly the express legal
requirement that the Board be composed of high-salaried employees
(GS-17), avoid the lessening of examiner stature. This is supported
by the detail of legislative history, which included Commission as-
surances to the Congress that delegations to the Review Board would
be evolutionary in nature rather than activist. Precautions thus were
taken that the creation of the Review Board would not constitute a
serious risk and a departure from the legislative intent of the Admin-





The FCC followed a praiseworthy procedure of soliciting com-
ments (particularly from practitioners) before deciding upon the
standards to adopt in (1) freeing itself from direct decision of
many cases, and (2) reserving to itself the cases which it con-
sidered most appropriate for agency decision. Moreover, it prefaced
approaches taken at large by nonregulatory agencies. Their economic and due process impact
is strong, but their activities have been regarded as analogous to the proprietary; hence, they
are free from the minimum procedural requirements governing rule-making under the
Administrative Procedure Act § 4, 60 Stat. 238 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1003 (1958), and from
such requirements governing adjudications, 5§ 5, 7-8, 60 Stat. 240 (1946), 5 U.S.C.
5§ 1004, 1006-07 (1958), because organic acts customarily afford no right of hearing.
See McCarty, Proposals for Changes in Appeals Procedures at the Department of Interior,
13 Ad. L. Rev. 159 (1961). S. 1336, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), would reassess and
limit realistically that freedom. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
""a48 Stat. 1068 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 155(d)(1) and (8) (Supp. IV,
1963).
114340 U.S. 474 (1951).
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its amended rules of procedure in this regard by an explanatory
statement.1 5'
May, 1964 amendments extended the Review Board's delegated
authority to include, inter alia, initial television application pro-
ceedings." Both in the earlier (1962) and in the current (1964)
rules, the FCC has spelled out in considerable detail the classifications
of cases being delegated. For example, in the current rules the Com-
mission expressly reserves for its own decision the important classifi-
cation of "proceedings involving the renewal or revocation of a
station license in the Broadcast Radio Services or the Common Carrier
Radio Services. 1.. It has bestowed upon examiners greater authority
with respect to interlocutory pleadings. The Commission, however,
continues to withhold from examiners the power to allow original
action on petitions related to the issues in the proceeding; instead, it
has given this authority to the Review Board.'
Obviously, proceedings will arise that well may involve issues
more important than the nondelegated renewal and revocation cases.
Against this eventuality, the FCC has provided the mechanism of
reserving the function of decision to itself upon an ad hoc basis at
the time of "designation for hearing or otherwise...... Moreover, un-
affected by the recent revision is its rule that any person aggrieved
by action taken under delegated authority may file an application
for review with the Commission."' The application will be dismissed
if it fails to make an adequate specification warranting Commission
consideration of the action taken in the following respects: (1) con-
flict with statute, regulation, case precedent or established Commis-
sion policy; (2) question of law or policy not previously resolved by
the Commission; (3) reliance upon precedent which should be over-
turned or revised; (4) erroneous findings on an important or material
question of fact; (5) prejudicial procedural error. " '
The success of the FCC experiment probably will be an important
factor in deciding the future of this more conservative adjudicatory
method, as compared with the agency certiorari technique. With the
recent new delegations, the Board has jurisdiction over nearly all
hearing cases appealed from examiners' initial decisions, the only
exceptions being broadcast and common carrier renewal and revoca-
tion cases. Thus, fairly full use is being made of the Board. In terms
".. 29 Fed. Reg. 6441-42 (1964).
1" 29 Fed. Reg. 6441 (1964).
15747 C.F.R. § 0.365 (1965).
1547 C.F.R. 5 0.341 (1965).
2" 47 C.F.R. 5 0.365(a) (1965).
'6047 C.F.R. § 1.115(a) (1965); see text accompanying and following note 153 supra.16147 C.F.R. § 1.11$(a)-(b) (1965).
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of volume, this is likely to keep the Board and its staff busy. Since
its inception in August 1962, through December 1964, the Board
has issued eighty-seven decisions. Before the TV delegations, the Board
issued forty-five decisions, and remanded six cases to the hearing
examiners for further hearing. Oral arguments were heard by the
Board in all of these cases in which they were requested. A substantial
burden has thus been removed from the Comniission. What volume
is to be expected in television is conjectural, although eventually it
is likely to be fairly substantial. Probably somewhere between twelve
and fifteen television cases a year is not too far from the mark. As
these involve much more effort than the average standard broadcast
cases, further substantial benefits should redound to the Commission.
The Board has attempted to exercise its independent authority
wisely by following established Commission policy. Nevertheless, in
appropriate cases it has not hesitated to interpret or extend these
policies to solve new problems upon which specific Commission solu-
tions do not exist. The Board apparently does not consider itself a
policy-making group, although of course the lines of distinction some-
times tend to blur. Its tendency to date has been toward conservative
exercise of its powers.
The Board has hired young attorneys in the lower grades (GS-7
and GS-9), and its current staff complement, excluding the five
Board Members, consists of fourteen attorneys, two engineers and
ten secretaries. None of this staff is used by the FCC Office of
Opinions and Review in its decision-writing work for the Commis-
sion on applications for review.
Only in a few instances has the Commission exercised its powers
of review of Board decisions following exceptions taken to examiner's
initial decisions.' In the first such instance the Commission decided
in the Board's favor after hearing oral argument."' In another matter
at about the same time, however, the Commission granted an applica-
tion for review and reversed the Board without asking for briefs or
hearing oral argument."' The effect of granting these applications for
review is greater than the number would seem to indicate. At the
present time, applications for review are filed in about one-third of
all Board decision cases. Depending on how the Commission proceeds
in the future, there could be the beginning of a trend or practice
which reduces or dilutes the effectiveness of the Review Board's work
.. Of the eighty-seven decisions issued by the Board, applications for review were
filed in thirty-two. In all but five cases the application for review was denied, and in
only four instances was the Board's decision reversed, revised or remanded after Com-
mission review.
"' Avoyelles Broadcasting Corp., 2 Radio Rep. 2d 292 (FCC 1964).
... People's Broadcasting Co., 2 Radio Rep. 2d 288 (FCC 1964).
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while shifting back to the Commission much of the burden which
it sought to free itself of by establishing the Board. If the Board tends
to become only another step in the adjudicatory review process, its
reason for existing will be largely removed. Although this point has
not been reached, it is too early to say with assurance that it will not
be. The Commission which invited the very specific delegation au-
thority involved is doubtless aware of the problem and is attempting
to avoid such a development.
Several Board decisions have gone to the courts of appeals after the
Commission refused review. At the end of 1964, six of these were
awaiting court decision. In the one case thus far decided, the court,
in a per curiam opinion, denied the appeal without discussing the
Board's role. 6' Thus, it is premature to state how much weight the
courts will attach to Review Board decisions. " '
With five members, the Review Board divides into ten different
panels of three to hear oral arguments and decide cases. Differences
in panel makeup obviously can present some problems in consistency,
and the fact that each decision is signed by a Board member who has
overseen its preparation also introduces variables in both substance
and form. Thus far, however, the Board has a fairly good record of
consistency. But consistency on the part of the Commission must be
achieved in its method of handling application for review and of
disposing of cases in which review has been granted.
To this point the Review Board has proved itself able to perform
the work delegated to it consistently and with reasonable dispatch. It,
however, has not yet been established with certainty that the Board
is not just another level in the adjudicatory process or that the Review
Board technique is superior to the certiorari procedure of agency
review of examiner's initial decisions. An obvious fact in striking
the balance will be whether the Commission adheres in a substantial
manner to a policy of reviewing Board actions in only the cases
which truly present questions upon which agency action is justified.
Reciprocally probative will be affirmative evidence that the Com-
mission reviews board actions when the petitioners make reasonable
showings that they meet the Commission's standard for review.
IV. RULE-MAKING
Thus far this Article has focused upon certain procedural develop-
l Wright & Malby, Inc. v. FCC, 2 Radio Rep. 2d 2056 (D.C. Cir., 1964).
e In a recent case in which the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia remanded a proceeding to the Commission because it had taken into consideration
matter outside the hearing record, the dissenting opinion of Judge Danaher emphasized the
expertness of the FCC Review Board. The Commission had reviewed the decision of the
Review Board in the proceeding.
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ments affecting investigations and adjudications by federal admin-
istrative agencies. Attention will now be given to several major prob-
lems connected with the procedure for adopting substantive rules."6 '
A. Procedure For Rule-Making
With few exceptions, " ' agency rules are required by the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act to be published in the Federal Register on a
current basis."' Generally, an agency authorized to issue rules must
(1) notify the public of the rules it proposes to adopt through pub-
lication in the Federal Register; (2) afford interested parties an
opportunity to submit at least written data, views or arguments with
respect thereto; (3) give consideration to all relevant information
presented by the parties; and (4) thereafter state concisely the basis
and purpose of the rules it adopts.' The ordinary exceptions to
extending this opportunity are matters involving (1) defense and
foreign affairs; (2) internal management and public property, con-
tracts or benefits; (3) interpretative rules, policy statements and
rules of organization, procedure or practice; and (4) situations in
which the agency for good cause finds it impracticable or contrary to
the public interest to follow this prescribed procedure, and no other
statute requires it to do so.' On the other hand, if a statute requires
an agency's rules to be made on the record after opportunity for an
567A "rule" is defined by the Administrative Procedure Act as follows:
"the whole or any part of any agency statement of general or particular
applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe
law or policy or to describe the organization, procedure, or practice require-
ments of any agency and includes the approval or prescription for the future
of rates, wages, corporate or financial structures or reorganizations thereof,
prices, facilities, appliances, services or allowances therefor or of valuations,
costs, or accounting, or practices bearing upon any of the foregoing." Act
§ 2(c), 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C., § 1001 (c) (1958).
This same provision also defines "rulemaking" as "agency process for the formulation,
amendment, or repeal of a rule." In contrast with the definitions of "rule" and "rulemaking,"
§ 2(d) of the act, 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001(d) (1958), defines "order" as "the
whole or any part of the final disposition (whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or decla-
ratory in form) of any agency in any matter other than rulemaking but including licensing,"
and "adjudication" as the "agency process for the formulation of an order."
.. Administrative Procedure Act § 3, 60 Stat. 238 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1002 (1958).
"'Administrative Procedure Act § 3(a), 60 Stat. 238 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1002(a)
(1958).
170 See Federal Register Act, 49 Stat. 500 (1935), as amended, 44 U.S.C. §§ 301-14
(1958) for the purpose of the act, the documents required by the act to be published in
the Federal Register, the effects of publication or failure to publish and related matters.
A valuable insight into the role and limitations of the Federal Register is given in New-
man, Government and Ignorance-A Progress Report on Publication of Federal Regulations,
63 Harv. L. Rev. 929 (1950).
"71Administrative Procedure Act 5 4(a)-(b), 60 Stat. 238 (1946), 5 U.S.C.
1003(a)-(b) (1958).
.. Administrative Procedure Act 5 4(a), 60 Stat. 238 (1946), 5 U.S.C. S 1003(a)
(1958) (also introductory para.).
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agency hearing, the more strict adjudicatory procedural provisions
of the Administrative Procedure Act in the main apply.17
It appears that the rules of practice and procedure of the agencies
rarely implement the minimum procedures mentioned in the im-
mediately preceding paragraph. The agency rules 74 to be followed
in a rule-making proceeding usually deal only in summary fashion
therewith and leave the subject basically to the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act "' and the agency notices of proposed rule-making. The
FTC rules, 176 however, are somewhat more specific and add to the
Administrative Procedure Act 7 7 requirement of a concise general
statement of the basis and purpose of the rule a progressive further
mandate implicit in the language "and any necessary findings. .. ."
The FCC rules of practice17' are much more detailed in relation to
rule-making practice than those of the usual agency.
B. Discussion Of Data Submitted
No rule of practice and procedure has been found that requires
an agency to discuss, as a part of its adoption or refusal to adopt a
proposed substantive rule, the basic and substantial views, data or
arguments filed in the rule-making proceeding. At least some of the
agencies do so in practice, however. Recently, both the FTC and the
FCC discussed in some detail the views advanced by interested persons
during the course of rule-making proceedings of some importance. 7'
A recent set of procedural rules.. of the CAB was attended by the
same execution of the spirit, if not the literal requirement, of the
Administrative Procedure Act. 8' However, concerning another re-
cent rule of importance, the FPC's statement was characterized by
17" Administrative Procedure Act § 7(b), 60 Star. 241 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1006(b)
(1958). The primary exception is that appearing in § 5(c) of the act, 60 Stat. 239 (1946),
5 U.S.C. 5 1004(c) (1958), which imposes separation of functions requirements.
74 See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. § 302.38 (1965) (CAB); 17 C.F.R. § 201.4 (1964) (SEC);
29 C.F.R. §§ 102.123-102.125 (1965) (NLRB); 49 C.F.R. 5 1.44 (Supp. 1965) (ICC).
'.. Administrative Procedure Act § 2, 60 Stat. 237 (1946), as amended, 5 U.S.C. 5
1001 (1958).
'116 C.F.R. § 1.67(d) (Supp. 1965) (FTC).
1
77 Section 4(b), 60 Stat. 238 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1003(b) (i958).
17'47 C.F.R. § 1.401-1.427 (1965) (FCC).
.
79 See the FTC rule issued June 22, 1964, and filed July 1, 1964, dealing with "Unfair
or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation to the Health Hazards of
Smoking," 29 Fed. Reg. 8324-75 (1964). See also Report and Order of the FCC Estab-
lishing a Schedule of Licensing Fees, 28 Fed. Reg. 4758 (1963), as modified by a later
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 28 Fed. Reg. 10911 (1963), petition to set aside order
denied, Aeronautical Radio, Inc. v, United States, 335 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 966 (1965).
0 Rules of Practice in Informal Non-public Investigations by the Bureau of Enforce-
ment, 14 C.F.R. §§ 305.1-305.12 (1965).
"'Administrative Procedure Act § 4(a), 60 Stat. 238 (1946), 5 U.S.C. 5 1003(a)
(1958), exempts rules of procedure from the rule-making procedural requirements of that
section of the act.
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an almost complete disregard of the comments made during the rule-
making proceeding."8 2
Because the cases in which the issue thus far has been presented have
shown no disposition to void administrative rule-making action for
failure to meet or discuss the views presented in the proceeding by
opponents to the rule,"' it would seem that Congressional relief is
both desirable and necessary. A useful analogue is the approach of
the Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act, approved by
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in
1961, which reinforces the federal requirement of agency considera-
tion of submitted views of rule-making by a policing mandate as
follows: "Upon adoption of a rule, the agency, if requested to do
so by an interested person either prior to adoption or within 30 days
thereafter, shall issue a concise statement of the principal reasons for
and against its adoption, incorporating therein its reasons for over-
ruling the considerations urged against its adoption."1"4
The mandate gives explicit direction to the agency and enables
persons affected to litigate their appeals with a proper understanding
of the agency position, and allows reviewing courts to apply the test
of reasonableness against a better background of agency reasoning.
Equally important is a further element: An agency creates a more
intelligent, deliberative product if it is required to meet head-on by
a recorded opinion the principal considerations urged upon it in a
rule-making proceeding."'
Of course, there is nothing to prevent the agencies from following
the suggested course of action without direction from Congress. Con-
sideration of such a procedure, including possible standards for ex-
cluding minor rules or amendments therefrom, should be a fitting
subject for inquiry by the Administrative Conference of the United
States, as now permanently established.8 "'
C. Other Rule-Making Problems
Two additional problems connected with rule-making will be
briefly noted. Although they are of great significance, the attention
they merit would prolong unduly an article of survey scope.
One is the extent to which a procedural rule permitting petitions
182 See FitzGerald, Adoption of Federal Power Commission Price-Changing Rules With-
,out Evidentiary Hearing: Statutory Collision, 18 Sw. L.J. 236, 242-53 (1963).
... Although the cases are not legion, they do not reflect conflicting opinions. Illustra-
tions are Courtaulds (Alabama) Inc. v. Dixon, 294 F.2d 899 (D.C. Cir. 1961), and
Bigelow-Sanford Carpet Co. v. FTC, 294 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
14 Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act § 3 (a) (2). (Emphasis added.)
.85 See Att'y Gen. Comm. on Administrative Procedure, Administrative Procedure in
Government Agencies, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 110-11 (1941).
"'Administrative Conference Act, 78 Stat. 615 (1964), 5 U.S.c. § 1045 (Supp. 1964).
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for waiver of substantive rules to be filed with an agency may become
an instrument for eliminating many otherwise required adjudicatory
hearings by barring them "at the threshold" through the exercise of
a general power to make rules."5 7
The other problem is the extent to which a party's participation
in a rule-making proceeding may be said to constitute his "hearing"
and thus discharge the agency from any obligation to afford him an
adjudicatory hearing before taking action adverse to him. 8' In the
past it has been common for courts to look to the plain wording
and context of statutory hearing requirements to determine the
exent of hearing rights intended to be conferred upon the individual.
With the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act, minimum
(but vastly different) hearing procedures were provided for the
majority of (a) adjudicative and (b) rulemaking proceedings to
which that act applies. The problem as to when an agency might
exercise its powers by rule-making procedure, as distinguished from
being required to follow the more stringent hearing procedures pro-
scribed for adjudication, was not of course settled or considered in
relation to the act. 8' If the agency has the authority to adopt a
subsequent rule, it may do so, in which event the minimum rule-
making procedures of the act apply (with limited exceptions); if,
on the other hand, its statute, applicable to the situation, requires
what is commonly referred to as a formal adjudicative proceeding,
it is necessary to follow the minimum procedures of the act rela-
tive to such adjudications. But in all events, as has been said, the act
does not compel an election between proceeding by adjudication or
by rulemaking, or vest power in the agency as to either. It fixes the
procedure to be followed once the agency has made its judgment of
whether to proceed by adjudication or by rulemaking; ° the mini-
mum procedure provided for formal adjudication, conferring fuller
... The Government tires of holding the hearings required by statute before action
can be taken adverse to a party, the hearings being a source of administrative backlogs.
It adopts a substantive rule permitting such action generally without hearings. The
validity of such rule is attacked as a circumvention of statutory hearing requirements.
The Government successfully contends that such statutory objections (including that of
due process) are of no moment since its rules of practice and procedure permit the com-
plaining party to petition for waiver of the offensive rule if he can show unique justification
for a waiver of its application to his particular situation. See, e.g., FPC v. Texaco, Inc.,
377 U.S. 33 (1964). This writer has commented that the Government (giving con-
creteness to the hypothetical illustration, the FPC) has created both an occasion of statutory
collision and successfully avoided its resolution by resort to a procedural rule. FitzGerald,
supra note 182, at 268-71.
.. See, e.g., Transcontinent Television Corp. v. FCC, 308 F.2d 339, 343 (D.C. Cir.
1962); cf. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Dillon, 16 Ad. L. Dec. 2d 642-47 (D.C.
Cir. 1965); See also Hearings on S. 1663, supra note 151, at 666; Fuchs, Agency Develop-
ment of Policy Through Rule-Making, 59 Nw. U.L. Rev. 781, 798-99 (1965).
""
5 NLRB v. A.P.W. Prods. Co., 316 F.2d 899, 905-06 (2d Cir. 1963).
19 Ibid.
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rights upon private parties, seemingly cannot be satisfied by such
hearing privileges as rulemaking affords. The recent decision of Trans-
continent Television Corp. v FCC... can be read to imply that par-
ticipation in a rule-making proceeding may defeat an otherwise
available statutory right to an adjudicative hearing with its fuller
hearing requirements under the Administrative Procedure Act; if so
read, the case blurs the distinctions between the minimum procedural
requirements provided in the Administrative Procedure Act for these
two classes of agency proceedings. If the actual facts of the Trans-
continent case are weighed, however, including the somewhat ambig-
uous statutory provision relative to a hearing, "2 it seems more reason-
able to conclude that the court made a sensible adjustment of tech-
nically conflicting statutory provisions by reading them in full
context as applied to the record before it. So construed, the Trans-
continent decision is cause for no alarm among those who weigh with
equal seriousness the due process rights of the individual and the
achievement of governmental statutory objectives.
One other use of a procedural rule (in this instance an order
applying to a single investigative proceeding) was approved in FCC
v. Schreiber.9 In the past, petitions to enforce agency subpoenas
duces tecum requiring the production of claimed "trade secrets" have
received careful scrutiny by the courts, which in a number of in-
stances have modified subpoenas before enforcing them."4 Recently,
however, procedural rules were promulgated which have the effect of
diminishing the judicial review traditionally accorded. In Schreiber
the aid of a district court was sought by the FCC to enforce a
subpoena duces tecum resisted on trade secret grounds. The respond-
ent, a witness not subject to the regulatory authority of the FCC,
was willing to comply with the subpoena only if the documents
were held in camera. There was no dispute relative to the FCC's
authority to obtain the documents. The district court weighed the
claim of irreparable competitive injury and upheld the respondent.
The Supreme Court reversed, limiting the trial court's authority to
consideration of whether the FCC's demand was an abuse of discre-
tion, and placing the burden of proof on the respondent to show
"g 308 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
192 "[R]easonable opportunity . . . to show cause by public hearing, if requested,
why such order of modification should not issue." 48 Stat. 1088 (1934), as amended,
47 U.S.C. § 316(a) (Supp. IV, 1963).
'gs85 S. Ct. 1459 (1965).
s
94 See, e.g., Graber Mfg. Co. v. Dixon, 223 F. Supp. 1020 (D.D.C. 1963); FCC v.
Cohn, 154 F. Supp. 899 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Cooper, Federal Agency Investigations: Require-
ments for the Production of Documents, 60 Mich. L. Rev. 187 (1960).
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(1) irreparable injury and (2) that such injury overbalanced the
public interest in disclosure.
There is reflected in the Court's opinion-though not necessarily
on the facts, which did not establish an impressive case for the claim
of "trade secret" impairment-an apparent retrenchment from
judicial principles applied in the past to relieve the subpoenaed wit-
ness from oppressive burden, partly under equitable powers of judi-
cial supervision, partly on the theory that the court's order furnishes
the basis for subsequent enforcement by contempt action and thus
the enforced agency order in effect is a step in the judicial process."5
The Court blends somewhat disconnected statutory provisions with
agency and judicial hypotheses. Thus, Commission power to "con-
duct its proceedings in such manner as will best conduce to the proper
dispatch of business and to the ends of justice""' is linked with (1)
section 3 (c) of the Administrative Procedure Act relating to free-
dom of access to matters of official record;".. (2) the Commission
duty to make annual reports to Congress;".8  (3) likelihood of in-
creased public acceptance of a Commission order (if any) at the
completion of the proceeding;"' (4) probabilities of increased infor-
mation being received by the agency from others if the respondent's
information is coerced;" and (5) the proposition that since competi-
tors had furnished similar information publicly on a voluntary basis
the respondent should be compelled to do likewise."' The result in
this case seems unimportant. It could have been reached by a per
curiam holding that the respondent failed to establish irreparable
injury: "the naked assertion of possible competitive injury does not
"' Professors Jaffe and Nathanson have characterized the lack of power on the part of
administrative agencies generally to enforce their own subpoenas as "of a piece with the
system . . . of committing the application of force to judicial supervision .. " Jaffe &
Nathanson, Administrative Law, Cases and Materials 29 (2d ed. 1961). Professor Cooper,
referring to the statement found in section 6(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act,
not mentioned in the Schreiber decision, that the court shall sustain a subpoena "to the
extent that it is found in be in accordance with law," concludes that the courts generally
have used as a test whether the disclosure sought is unreasonable. As he points out, one
device used by the courts has been the modification of the subpoena by order of the court
requiring the agency to take steps to avoid public disclosure of trade secrets revealed to it.
Cooper, Federal Agency Investigations: Requirements for the Production of Documents,
60 Mich. L. Rev. 187, 194 (1961). See also on the related matter of personal privacy,
Newman, The Process of Prescribing Due Process, 49 Calif. L. Rev. 211 (1961); Newman,
Some Facts on Fact-Finding by an Investigatory Commission, 13 Ad. L. Rev. 120 (1961).
"Every foreign state that has deprived persons of fundamental 'property rights' has eventually
also taken away the rights of the person .... " Jackson, The Task of Maintaining Our





201 Id. at 1472.
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establish that the Presiding Officer abused his discretion in declining
to accord confidential treatment ... "'
Reminiscent of the Texaco... approach, however, is the strained
use of the procedural rule to shift an agency burden upon a re-
spondent asserting a property right-the agency burden of demon-
strating the rational need of public disclosure becomes the respond-
ent's burden of showing that his plight should not be sacrificed to
the asserted public need (justified not from the circumstances of the
proceeding but from a joinder of what seems to be heterogenous,
generalized and speculative factors). Thus, from a statutory power
to conduct proceedings efficiently conducive to the ends of justice
is born a procedural rule, applied with the approval of the Court to
a sensitive trade secrets area, which finds its support in agency asser-
tions little less naked than those of this subpoenaed witness.
202 Ibid.
203 377 U.S. 33 (1964). See note 187 supra.
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